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Abstract 
 
Systems software quality, and system security in particular, is often 
compromised by phishing attacks. The latter were relatively easy to 
detect through phishing content filters, in the past. However, it has 
been increasingly difficult to stop more recent and sophisticated 
social phishing attacks. To protect the citizens from new types of 
phishing attacks, software quality engineers need to provide equally 
sophisticating preventive technology that models people’s reactions. 
The authors considered the behaviour of people on the Internet from 
a socio-cognitive perspective and deduced who could be more prone 
to be spoofed by social phishing techniques. The authors herein 
propose a computational and interdisciplinary metamodelling 
methodology, which can assist in capturing and understanding 
people’s interactive behaviour when they are online. Online 
behaviour can reveal Internet users’ knowledge, information, and 
beliefs in a given social context; these could also constitute 
significant factors for trust in social phishing circumstances which, 
in turn, can provide valuable insights and decision making meta-
knowledge for recognition of potential victims of phishers. The 
proposed modelling approach is illustrated and explained using real-
life phishing cases. This meta-model can i) help social computing 
and phishing researchers to understand users’ trust decisions from a 
socio-cognitive perspective, and ii) open ways to integrate artificial 
intelligence design techniques within software quality management 
practices in order to protect citizens from being spoofed by social 
phishing attacks. Thus, this software design quality approach will 
increase system security as a proactive maintenance strategy. 
Keywords: security, social phishing, trust, user behaviour 
modelling, metamodel, finite state machine (FSM), usability and 
learnability, social cognitive theory, software quality engineering. 
1.0 Introduction  
Social engineering is the psychological manipulation of people’s vulnerabilities to 
produce a desired effect based on people’s emotions and general predictive 
behaviour [1]. Social engineering techniques take advantage of people’s cognitive 
biases and misconceptions or misinformation. In the security field, this is also 
referred as the art and science of human hacking [2]. Currently, social engineering 
is one of the most prominent methods used to conduct phishing attacks. The main 
reasons for this are: i) social engineering is relatively easy to apply compared to 
other hacking techniques and ii) there is no limit to social engineering techniques 
as long as there exists imagination and dark creativity to exploit different situations 
and contexts [3]. Such phishing attacks that employ social engineering tricks are 
also known as social phishing [4]. Social phishing is increasing and becoming 
more deceptive and sophisticated and, thus, difficult to be recognised at once [5]. 
For example, socially-aware phishing, context-aware phishing, reverse social 
engineering and baiting are types of intelligent and sophisticating phishing attacks.  
Since the available anti-phishing technologies are not well-designed to protect 
against social phishing attempts, there is a need to improve the design and software 
quality of social computing technologies, so they, in turn, can help protect the 
citizens [6]. From the software engineering perspective, the quality of the software 
should be assured mainly by focusing on the users, i.e., considering usable security 
methods and strategies [6, 7]. Equally important is equipping the people with 
effective anti-phishing knowledge, skills and awareness [6, 8, 9]. Otherwise stated, 
by understanding the vulnerabilities of the potential (and ideal for social phishers) 
victims, the researchers and practitioners in the areas of social computing, usable 
security, security education, training and awareness should be able to integrate the 
existing adaptive techniques (e.g. [10, 11, 12]) to protect people from being 
spoofed by social phishing attacks. 
This research study is led by the research questions: RQ1. ‘Who are more prone to 
be spoofed by social phishing techniques?’ and RQ2. ‘Could online users’ 
behaviour and decision making be modelled?’ To answer these questions, the 
authors need to study the role of beliefs and contexts in the ‘netizens’ decision 
making process in the social phishing context, and upon this propose a logic model 
of the netizens’ behaviour. This model can help social computing researchers 
understand people’s trust decisions from a behavioural perspective, and eventually 
point towards adopting existing artificial intelligence techniques to adaptively 
prevent people from being spoofed by social phishing attacks. 
In this paper, the authors first review the related user behaviour research in 
phishing. Second, the authors propose the way of defining a model of ICT users’ 
behaviour towards social phishing attacks. Last, the authors carry out a test to 
verify the proposed model. 
2.0 Literature Review and Related Work  
There exist user-related studies on phishing attacks. Some researchers conducted 
usability research on end-users: Zhang et al. observed users when they were using 
different types of anti-phishing toolbars, and discerned their usability defects [13]. 
Li conducted usability evaluation studies and i) concluded on what information and 
knowledge anti-phishing toolbars should convey and ii) gave valuable advice on 
how to present this security-related information in a usable way [7]. 
Besides the usability research, some researchers delved into phishing problems 
from the users’ behaviour perspective. Some researchers conducted research to 
find out about modelling of phishing in the social phishing context [7, 14, 15] and 
proceeded in constructing some models (or meta-models) of phishing under certain 
abstract conditions and circumstances. For example, Jakobsson conceptualised and 
implemented a graphical representation to capture and model the essence of 
phishing attacks. Such models can help in detecting the vulnerabilities of a system 
and determine suitable defence mechanisms for the users. [14]. Similarly, Li and 
other researchers built a mathematical model to depict users’ behaviour in the 
phishing context [7]. In this model, it was emphasised that the appropriate 
available knowledge is the key factor to impact the decisions of online users and 
thus influence their choices and beliefs in the content of a phishing attempt. 
Finally, in the work of Dong et al., a model for visualising the interaction between 
user and phishing was designed [15]. This type of model can help security 
professionals in determining the mismatches between users’ perceptions of 
phishing attacks and the attacks in reality, so that the latter can be captured and 
handled through the design of anti-phishing applications and suitable education. 
Although the above mentioned studies contribute to the phishing research in a 
meaningful way, they significantly lack in addressing the problem of social 
phishing by considering substantial details. Further, in order to understand the end 
users’ interactive behaviour in the socio-cognitive context of this particular type of 
emerging phishing attacks, some user behaviour research needs to be further 
conducted. The user behaviour modelling can actually be proved helpful in 
viewing and defining a sequential order of the decision making process. Therefore, 
one alternative to model online citizens’ behaviour is to utilise decision-based 
making theories, which could also be useful as supportive references for social 
phishing research. For example, a decision tree is one technique that is simple to 
understand since it describes the decision making process using a flow-chart-like 
model [16, 17], which consists of three types of nodes, decision nodes, chance 
nodes, and end nodes. A decision tree can sequentially depict how factors can 
affect the final decision. Adopting a more abstract computational perspective, a 
decision tree can be considered as a deterministic finite state automaton, in which 
the sequence of the factors is deterministic and each node of a decision tree is a 
state in the automaton. However, the rather fixed properties of the deterministic 
and non-deterministic finite state automata are not enough for so many different 
users’ behaviour modelling. This is so mainly because for different individuals 
(with different beliefs, knowledge and value systems) the sequence of the factors is 
not and cannot always be the same [7] due to the richness of the socio-cognitive 
context and situations and the different trust requirements and dependencies. 
In previous social and cognitive context studies [18, 19, 20, 21], trust has not been 
considered as only a mental attitude/attribute or a pure internal belief. Instead, the 
concept of trust is described as consisting of three basic elements: a mental 
attitude, a decision to rely upon the other, and behaviour. Moreover, a mental 
attitude represents a belief from the evaluation of the agent’s trustworthiness, and a 
prediction based on the agent’s willingness and ability to produce some effects 
[20]. A decision to rely on the others refers to the intention to delegate the 
production of a desired goal [20]. Behaviour means to take actions to trust another 
agent and build a practical, informational relation between the parties [20]. In this 
way, trust is described as a framework, whose elements are isolated from each 
other. For example, Durante presented that the internal attribution of trustors and 
the environmental attribution of trustees affect the trust [20]. Another example is 
provided by other researchers, who also tried to present the trust model as capital 
and studied the cognitive dynamics from the capital perspective and point of view 
[21]. Furthermore, Castelfranchi et al. [19] built a tree model to describe how users 
make trust decisions. In this tree model, the researchers defined the different 
weighed value(s) for different factors of trustees. The use of different weights can 
result in finding how much the different factors can affect the trustors’ attitude on 
trust. Although these studies apply the trust theory from the social and cognitive 
perspectives, the models themselves are not able to define how (or how much/far) 
the different internal and external attributions affect each other and 
correspondingly affect the final trust decision. Considering the previous, the 
authors proceeded to a mathematical (computational) method on how to model the 
behaviour pattern of an online user. 
3.0 Behaviour Modelling Methodology for Online Users  
In order to define as many factors as possible considered in the social phishing 
research, the authors proceeded to an analysis of the phishing context from a socio-
cognitive perspective. In the social phishing context, trustors are the potential 
victims who receive phishing information, and trustees are the phishers associated 
with their own phishing information. To build a trust relationship, trustees should 
present their internal and external attributions so that trustors may believe that 
trustees can be trusted. In a socio-cognitive theoretical framework, this means that 
these attributions are induced from the trustors’ perspectives and affect the 
trustors’ decisions [19, 20, 21, 22]. Although these studies highlighted the 
combined effect of competence and sincerity on the trustworthiness of information, 
the online security research field still lacks studies on how and on which order the 
attributions affect each other in their models. 
The behaviour modelling methodology introduced in this paper is based on the 
finite state automata theory [23]. This theory represents a dynamic and 
computational modelling approach, which is able to describe a sequence, a 
selection, a multiple selection, and a repetition (or iteration) of events and/or 
attributions through transitions of states, which depict the situational context of 
phishing. The finite state automaton (FSM) has a limited, finite number of possible 
states. It has initial states, final states and current states. At each change of states, a 
deterministic or/and non-deterministic input is given, and the next state is 
correspondingly transitioned. The new state depends only on the current state and 
the symbol input. Regarding the representation of the FSM, the conventional 
notation is also followed, that is: a circle represents a state, an arrow represents 
state transition and the arrow label indicates the input value corresponding to the 
transition. The initial state is usually represented by an arrow with no origin 
pointing to the circle and the final state is drawn by a double circle. Next the 
authors illustrate the above through examples in which they define the 
relationships among these internal and external factors that outline and determine 
the characteristics of the potential human victims, who should rather be considered 
as a more-prone-to social phishing attacks group of citizens. 
3.1 Modelling Internal Attributions  
The internal attributions utilised and considered for modelling here include [20]: 
• Competence: Trustee’s qualities such as skills, expertise, and knowledge 
needed to perform the task. 
• Willingness: Trustee’s intention and readiness to perform the task. 
• Persistence: Trustee’s steadiness in the intention to perform the task.  
• Dependence: Trustor’s belief that it is either necessary or preferable to 
rely on the trustee in order to obtain a goal. 
• Fulfilment: Trustor’s belief that the goal will be achieved due to the 
trustee. 
• Motivation: Reasons that persuade the trustee to adopt the goal. 
The authors use a phishing email as an example and subsequently analyse the case 
utilising the above attributes: 
Case 1: Your flight is cancelled; please transfer100 euro to bank account xxxx-
xxxx-xxxx-xxxx as collaterals to reserve the seat for your next flight. We will refund 
the money back to you after your trip. 
In case 1, this is how the trustee(s), i.e. the fraudster(s), presented or implied their 
internal attributions, factors in the social context of phishing. The competence is 
that the agency is competent on the ticket reservation; the willingness is that the 
agency is going to give this offer to every passenger, whose flight is also cancelled; 
the persistence from the message implies the money is required based on the flight 
company’s regulation; the dependence refers to paying the money is one preferable 
way to reserve the flight; the fulfilment means only the flight agency knows how to 
reserve the flight ticket in this special occasion; and the motivation of this message 
is that this is a part of the agency’s commitment.  
To apply the finite state automata theory to model the above internal attributions, 
one state and its subsequent states associated with their corresponding inputs need 
to be defined. In the social-cognitive theory, internal and external attributions are 
the factors that impact the attitude of trustors. Herein, the authors firstly consider 
the internal attributions as the direct input of the model. The internal attribution of 
trust depends on the evaluation of the trustee’s qualities and defects. An evaluation 
result of different internal attributions can be selected as inputs, and the different 
inputs can make the current state to the different subsequent states respectively. 
Next, the internal attributions are discussed situation wise. 
Situation 1: Herein, the authors firstly consider the internal attributions as the 
direct input of the model. If a person receives a piece of phishing information and 
believes that s/he has adequate knowledge on phishing prevention, the person has 
no intention to rely on the phishing information (trustee). This description is able to 
be defined in finite state machine as Figure 1. In the figure, the S0 is the state that a 
person receives a piece of phishing information, i1 stands for the input that the 
person believes that s/he has adequate knowledge on phishing prevention. S1 
represents the state that s/he has no intention to rely on the phishing information. 
 
 
Figure 1: Transferring from one state to another state with internal attribution as an input  
 
Situation 2: Many different internal attributions can be selected as inputs, and the 
different inputs can make the current state to the different subsequent states 
respectively. For example, in Figure 2, the S0 is the state that a person receives a 
S0 i1 S1 
i1 
piece of phishing information, i1 stands for the input that the person believes that 
s/he has adequate knowledge on phishing prevention, and i2 is that s/he has an 
intention to achieve the goal (e.g., update the security protection of their online 
banking services) in the phishing information. The state S1 to be transferred with 
the input i1 means s/he would not intend to rely on the phishing information, and 
the state S2 to be transferred with the input i2 indicates that s/he intends to rely on 
the phishing information. 
 
 
Figure 2: Transferring state from one state to two different states with two internal 
attributions as inputs 
 
Situation 3: When defining the ways to transfer to the target state, there might be 
many possible cases. Firstly, it is possible to transfer from a source state with 
different inputs, e.g., in Figure 3 the state S1 can be reached from S0 with different 
inputs i1 and i2. For example, the S0 is the state that a person receives a piece of 
phishing information, i1 stands for the input that the person believes that s/he has 
adequate knowledge on phishing prevention, and i2 is that s/he has no intention to 
achieve the goal (e.g., up-date the security protection of their online banking 
services) in the phishing information. The state S1 to be transferred with both 
inputs means s/he would not intend to rely on the phishing information. 
 
 
Figure 3: Transferring from one state to another one state with two internal attributions as 
inputs  
 
Situation 4: It is also possible that a subsequent state can be transferred from 
different previous states. For example, in Figure 4, a person receives a piece of 
phishing information directly (S0) or this person is asked for help from someone 
who claims to be his or her friends or relatives (S0’).  From the both source states, 
the person could believe in s/he has adequate knowledge (i1) so that not to intend 
to rely on the phishing in-formation (S1). 
S0 
i1 
i2 
S1 
i2 
S0 
S1 
S2 
i1 
 
 
Figure 4: Transferring from two states to another one state with two internal attributions as 
inputs  
 
In this study, the authors assume that all the parties in the phishing context share 
the same scale to measure the trustworthiness; also when a trustor evaluates the 
trustworthiness of a trustee, a trustor may use his/her own expectations as the 
benchmark value to compare with the corresponding value internal attributions of 
trustees. If a benchmark value is different from the value of the corresponding 
internal attributions, the trustor may have positive or negative attitude towards the 
corresponding internal attributions. The formula would be as follows: 
wk = Ak – Ek (k=1, 2…, 6). (1) 
In this formula, Ak is the presented value of the kth internal attribution, Ek is the 
expectation value of a trustor towards the kth internal attribution, and wk denotes 
the trustor’s attitude towards the kth attribution. If the presented value of an internal 
attribution is higher than a trustor’s expectation value, the trustor will have a 
positive attitude on the corresponding internal attribution. The previous research on 
emotion analysis and deep learning on the text [10, 11, 12] can be applied to 
quantify Ak and Ek. 
Previous research studies have observed that the adaptability of agents in the trust 
relationship [20] and the feedback effects of some internal attribution of trustees 
[19] are also emphasised while modelling the trust relationship. Therefore, when 
defining a user behaviour model in social phishing context, feedback (i.e., past 
experiences) should also be considered. 
For example, in the aforementioned case 1, a person receives the phishing email 
(S0), and s/he evaluates the phishing email (S1) utilising the adequate knowledge 
s/he possesses (i1). After his/her evaluation, s/he detects trustee’s defects, which is 
true in actual. Thus, s/he makes a correct decision protecting himself/herself from 
falling for the attack, and the positive feedback from this experience is given as 
input (i1) when the same state (S1) is reached next time. This means that the same 
input (i1) will be used for the same state (S0) in the future. Otherwise, the negative 
feedback is given when the same state (S1’) is reached again, which means the 
same input (i1’) is not taken into account and other positive-feedback input, for 
example (i2), is going to be used. In addition, the accumulated influence of the 
same feedback should be considered in the model, i.e. the feedback impacts the 
i1 
i1 ’ 
S0 
S0’ 
S1 
attitudes towards the internal attributions in an accumulated way, and the formula 
(1) is now improved as follows: 
wk = Ak – Ek + wk’ (k = 1, 2…, 6). (2) 
In the above formula, wk’ denotes the adjusted value according to the feedback 
from the past experiences, which means the wk’ can be calculated with the 
following formula: 
wk’= Ak – Ek’  (k = 1, 2…, 6). (3) 
In the above formula, Ak is the presented value of the kth internal attribution, and 
Ek’ is the adjusted expectation value of a trustor towards the kth internal attribution, 
which is changed according to the feedback from the past experiences. Apparently, 
if the feedback is positive, Ek’ is changed to a smaller value than the previous time. 
Otherwise, Ek’ is changed to a bigger value than the previous time. 
3.2 Modelling External Attributions  
External attributions refer to positive and/or negative environmental conditions, 
including opportunities, resources, interferences and adversities [18, 20]. If the 
same case 1 is considered, the environmental conditions can be, for example, that 
the phishing message is received during a festive season when people need to 
travel; or it is bad weather, such as a stormy or a foggy day when flights are often 
cancelled due to low visibility; or the phishing email recipient has a busy schedule 
with no time to check the credibility of the email; and the list can go on. When a 
person receives such a phishing message, s/he may refer to these environmental 
conditions as well. Similar to the internal attributions, the external ones are also 
considered as the inputs for user behaviour models. The only difference in the way 
the external attributions are treated is, the way to express how the external 
attributions affect the trust attitude.  
For the internal ones, the trust attitude is based on trustors’ expectation value of 
certain internal attributions. However, in their modelling method, the authors 
consider that the external attributions may respectively have an effect according to 
the perceptions of different individuals. For example, someone may consider 
online social tools as a trustworthy resource (one type of external environment), 
but others may not think of that due to the different perception and possible 
negative or positive experiences regarding the security and privacy of these online 
social tools. Therefore, when the authors define how the trust attitude is affected, 
they only use the perception to depict the trustors’ attitude on external attributions. 
This means that when a person perceives an external attribution as a positive one, 
the corresponding attitude has a positive value. Otherwise, the corresponding 
attitude has a negative value. This could be written as follows: 
Wk = Pk (k = 1, 2…, n). (4) 
In formula 4, Wk is trustors’ attitude on the kth external attribution, and Pk is the 
trustors’ perception on the kth external attribution. Same as in internal attributions, 
the feedback effects also apply to external attributions. The trustors’ attitude value 
regarding the feedback on the kth external attribution is given as follows: 
Wk = Pk + Wk’ (k = 1, 2…, n). (5) 
In formula 5, Wk’ is the feedback value of the kth external attribution from the last 
time, which equals the adjusted perception (Pk’) on the kth external attribution as 
follows in the next section. 
3.3 Modelling User Behaviour: To Trust or Not to Trust?  
The authors model user behavioural patterns mainly focusing on how people 
consider the internal and the external attributions. Therefore, modelling of user 
behaviour proceeds to combine the possible states (behaviour steps) and inputs 
(internal and external attributions) to describe the whole process of how the users’ 
trust decisions are made step by step. In this case, the resulting model of user 
behaviour is different respectively. This is because the different expectation value 
of internal attributions results in the different trust attitude on the internal 
attributions, and the different perception of external attributions leads to the trust 
attitude respectively. Instead of giving a specific user behaviour model, the authors 
only present a modelling methodology described as follows: 
• Every input is given a certain weighted value so that to explicitly add a 
trust attitude towards an internal or an external attribution. 
• The inputs associated with their weighted value are selected, defined and 
added between two states. 
• The order of state transitions is defined, i.e., to define the initial state, the 
final state(s) and the possible reachable/reached states transferred between 
the initial state and the final state(s). 
In this way, the model finally ends up with one of the final states where a trustor 
makes a decision whether to trust or not to trust, in order to proceed to the next 
action. With this modelling methodology, the resulted model is a directed and 
weighted graph. Based on the definition of the weighted value of each input, the 
authors define that the path with the biggest weighted value is the most vulnerable 
mental model to social phishing attacks. 
4.0 Modelling of Social Phishing Cases 
Again, let us consider a real life phishing case that happened in China and analysed 
in detail by the researchers of the article in reference [24]. 
Case 2: On the 9th of February 2014, soon after the 2014 Chinese New Year, the 
police in Guangdong province launched a raid on saunas, karaoke bars and other 
venues of ill repute in Dongguan, a city in Guangdong province of China, famous 
for manufacturing and a highly developed sex industry. The police detained 67 
people and shut down 12 venues. The news should have confirmed that the sex 
industry is not protected by the law in China, however. Some people got phished 
because of (the reporting of) these social events happening. According to the text 
from a newspaper published in Guangdong, some victims reported that they 
received phishing SMS messages saying: “Dad, I have been caught by the police 
when I played in Dongguan last night, please transfer *** yuan as bail to the bank 
account ******.” 
In the above case 2, a person receives the message claiming to be from a close 
relative and asks for money to bail out (state: S0). In this simple case, let us take a 
look at how the receiver will make the decision on trusting the message or not. 
Firstly, the authors assume that the content of the message is considered and 
checked against the recipient’s knowledge. This means that the relationship should 
be guaranteed from the attributes of the message (input: ii), e.g., the subscription 
number of the sender’s phone, the sender’s accent, and the certain implicit 
behavioural patterns. If these internal attributions in the message present higher 
value than the receiver’s expectation, receivers may give positive trust attitude 
towards these attributions (weighted attitude: wk1). The next state (state: S1) in the 
mind of the receiver is to consider the external attributions (input: i2), e.g., the 
various sources of news related to the content of the message, his/her children or 
relatives are actually visiting the said city, their children or relatives have habits of 
gambling and visiting similar venues, their children or relatives are out of the 
mobile phone range, and so on. If the receiver believes that the message content as 
described should have happened in the current occasion, the receiver’s attitude 
would be towards trusting the message (weighted attitude: Wk2). After the 
evaluation of internal and external attributions, the receiver makes a decision 
(state: S2). 
It is also possible that after the message is received, the receiver firstly considers 
the external environment, which is just right at the time after the sex raid in 
Dongguan (input: i1’). Then the receiver has a certain attitude on the external 
attributions (Wk1’), the environment (state: S1’). Compared to the state S1, the 
receiver’s mind may be affected by the external attributions, the state S1’ is, 
therefore, different from his/her mental perspective. Regarding the receiver’s next 
move, it can be assumed that s/he may believe that s/he knows the sender so well 
that it is assured that the sender is caught in the sex raid. Therefore, when the 
receiver considers the internal attributions of the message (input: i2’), s/he has a 
lower expectation value on these internal attributions, and give higher weighted 
value on trust attitude (wk2’). After the evaluation of the internal attributions, the 
receiver may make another decision (state: S2). Both the behavioural patterns are 
depicted in Figure 5. From the figure, one can easily compare and find out the most 
vulnerable behavioural pattern, i.e. the path in the diagram with the biggest 
weighted value of trust attitude. 
 
 
Figure 5: One example to show the user behaviour modelling in the social phishing context  
 
In Figure 5, let us assume that the sum value of trust weight is ∑W, now 
• If the trustor (i.e., the SMS receiver) chooses the first path, then          
∑W= wk1 + Wk2 (where k1=1...6; k2=1...n) 
• If the trustor chooses the second path, then                                            
∑W= Wk1’+ wk2’ (where k1’=1...n; k2’=1...6) 
In order to trust the mobile message, the sum value of trust has to be positive, i.e., 
∑W>0. The higher will be the sum value of trust, so will be the possibility that the 
trustor will respond to the phishing attack. For the zero and negative values, i.e., 
∑W≤0, the chance that the trustor will respond to the SMS will be minimal.  
Humans have always been the weakest link in information security and, thus, the 
main target of deceitful attacks. If the question is why humans are easily deceived 
one can find many personal factors and reasons. Among the first that come to mind 
are: Socio-cultural issues such as a person might wonder how s/he will be 
remembered (was s/he helpful or not) or a person might not want to insult the other 
person (follows a high moral code), or a person thinks this is a good relationship 
investment (since social relationships are valued high), or a person is in a much 
lower social/power status (and thus does not dare to reject requests from others). 
It constitutes a great challenge to consider assumptions of perceptual thresholds of 
multi-state positions (see e.g. [25]) to essentially argue why people lie and deceit 
[26], and why people trust and how they make trust decisions. Fareri et al., arguing 
on computational substrates of social value in interpersonal collaboration, support 
that ‘our brains reward us for taking the risk to trust’ [27]. Others support that 
people feel guilty if they do not trust other people relationships, businesses, 
governments etc. [28], and that this trust to strangers, even when it does not make 
i2 (Wk2) 
i1’ (Wk1’) 
 S1 S2 
i1 (wk1) 
i2 ’ (wk2’) 
S1’ 
S0 
sense, seems to be the main reason that those bank scams on the Internet continue 
to flourish [28]. This study supports the need for adopting theories of vulnerable 
behaviour detection in assisting social phishing victims. This represents a radical 
innovation in design thinking about the way information is processed and informed 
decisions are made. There might also be limitations in utilising these theories. 
Special cases could be people who have lost the ability to make own decisions, 
such as ill people. They may have special security needs. (see e.g. [29]).  
Many adaptive techniques [10, 11, 12] of learning users’ behaviour types and 
emotions can complementarily be applied to collect people’s emotional states and 
consequent attitudes, so that someone could calculate each input value to find out 
the most vulnerable behaviour towards social phishing attacks. With this 
computational and dynamic approach, the resulted (meta)model is a directed and 
weighted graph, that can be verifiable and testable due to its formal semantics and 
syntax [30]. Following this specification model someone can finally reach one of 
the final states, where a trustor, in order to proceed, makes a decision whether to 
trust or not to trust. For instance, based on the definition of the weighted value of 
each input, the authors define and verify that the path with the biggest weighted 
value is the most vulnerable mental model to social phishing attacks. 
This is the first time that weighted FSM modelling is used in the context of social 
phishing and security. Similar weighted FSM models have been applied in protocol 
specifications and performance analysis [31] and in speech recognition [32].  
5.0 Summary, Conclusions and Future Work  
As used in psychology, education, and communication, socio-cognitive models 
depict an individual’s knowledge use and acquisition and show how it can be 
directly related to observing people within the context of their social interactions, 
experiences, and external influences. Based on the latter, the authors introduced a 
computational modelling methodology to describe how people’s beliefs, 
knowledge and social context affect their trust decisions in the case of social 
phishing attacks. This methodology utilises knowledge from interdisciplinary 
areas, including analysis of online users’ needs, theories about trust and 
trustworthiness and classic computational theories through deterministic and non-
deterministic modelling. Through this conceptual computational modelling, 
researchers and practitioners should be able to investigate vulnerable behavioural 
patterns of social phishing. 
This particular modelling can also be helpful to anti-phishing software designers 
because it can assist in learning the vulnerable human behaviour patterns and warn 
users when a spoofing scam exploiting users’ behaviour vulnerabilities is detected. 
It is convenient to apply the behaviour model in software when implementing the 
social-context phishing prevention tools. This type of modelling that targets to 
assist in the learning of vulnerable human behaviour patterns could increase anti-
phishing software tools’ learnability through computational intelligence 
techniques, such as machine learning. For instance, the software design of anti-
phishing toolbars and related technology could outperform when implementing the 
related design knowledge. This work captures a new type of design thinking, rich 
and abstract enough to model critical user needs and details. This user behaviour 
modelling method will further be implemented and integrated with adaptive 
algorithms to support adequate technology for public awareness. 
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